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COMMENT

Severed Roots: The Sealed Adoption
Records Controversy
I.

INTRODUCTION

Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out
And to whom I was like to give offense.
Something there is
that doesn't love a wall,
That wants it down.'
In 1980 James George, a 33-year-old adopted adult, contacted the
juvenile court of Jackson County, Missouri, for the purpose of
discovering the names of his biological parents.' George was dying
of chronic leukemia. His only chance of survival was to find a suitable
donor of bone marrow, and the only people who would make suitable
donors would be members of his immediate biological family. George
wanted to find them and convince them to donate bone marrow, a
process which is "not ordinarily life threatening nor even seriously
discomforting to the donor." 3 The Missouri appellate court rejected
his application to see his records, holding that the increase in his
chances of survival if he could find his parents, although representing his only chance to live, was too slight to warrant opening the
records. 4
George's story is a dramatic one. Most adopted adults who seek
to open their birth records do so not for medical reasons, but to
satisfy a psychological need to know their history. 5 But his tale, if
dramatic, accurately illustrates the controversy surrounding sealed adoption records.
1. R. FROST, The Mending Wall, inTHE COMPLETE POEMS OF ROBERT
47 (1949).
2. In Re Application of George, 625 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. App. 1981).
3.Id.at 155.
4.Id.
5. See J.TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS (1973) at 39-40.

FROST
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Adoption in the United States is purely a creature of statute.6
All fifty states have laws governing in detail the process of adoption
and its legal effects. 7 In particular, most states have enacted statutes
which compel courts handling adoptions to seal birth and adoption
records permanently, opening them only upon court order. 8 This is
the sealed records controversy: should an adoptee, upon reaching
adulthood, be allowed to see his adoption records, in spite of the
acknowledged privacy interests of the other parties? This comment
will study the boundaries of that controversy. First, it will be necessary
to analyze the interests of each of the parties to the adoption-the
adoptee, the birth parents, and the adoptive parents. The state's interest in the controversy will also be considered. Next, case law and
statutory law presently in effect in the United States will be analyzed,
and the different schemes of the several states will be compared.
Finally, suggestions will be offered as to the most equitable ways to
balance the concerns of all the parties involved.

II.

ADOPTION IN THE UNITED

STATES

When a child is given up for adoption, law and social science
come together to find the child a new home. 9 After proceedings involving social workers, judges, attorneys, doctors, and clergy, the final
step is taken-all records of the child's past are placed in a file and
sealed permanently.'" A new birth certificate is then issued, substituting
the names, addresses, occupations, and birthdates of the adoptive
parents for those of the biological parents." Certain information, such
as the name of the attending physician at birth and the name of the
hospital, is often omitted.' 2
6. Note, Recognizing the Needs of the Adopted Person: A Proposal to Amend
the Illinois Adoption Act, 6 Loy. U. CHI. L. REV. 49 (1975) (hereinafter cited as
Note, Recognizing the Needs).

7. See, e.g., Illinois Adoption Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 1501-1705 (1983),
describing who may be adopted and how, in meticulous detail.
8. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15 (1960); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 11.17 (Vernon 1975).
9. For criticism and general overview of the adoption system, see M. BENET,
THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION (1976).
10. See supra note 8. At present, three states allow adult adoptees to see their
original birth certificates without a court order. ALA. CODE § 26-10-4 (1975); IDAHO
CODE § 16-1511 (1953); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423 (1980). See infra note 145 and
accompanying text for a discussion of "open state" policies.
11. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11 1/2, § 73-17 (1977); WIs. STAT. § 48.94

(1981).

12. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.570(3) (1982): "The new birth certificate
when issued shall not contain the place of birth, hospital, and name of doctor or
midwife."
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The reasons for the sealing of the records are as diverse as the

parties intended to be protected.' 3 The child needs a new start in life,
free from the stigma of illegitimacy."' The natural parents may want
to leave in the past what may well have been a terrible experience
for them. "5The adoptive parents deserve privacy from the prying eyes
of the public, and freedom from interference from the natural parents
6

in the rearing of their child.'

Almost without exception, the sealed adoption records will be

opened only by court order.' 7 The various states have enacted different types of legislation designed to furnish a standard that must

be met in order to open the records. The most traditional statutory
scheme, and until recently almost the only scheme in effect, requires
a showing of "good cause." ' " Some states have recognized a distinction between the two types of information contained in the recordsthat which identifies the parties versus that which is background

information-and have incorporated different burdens of persuasion

needed to gain access to the different types of information into their
statutes. 19
Once the records are sealed and the adoption process is complete, the altered birth certificate is issued, announcing the legal fiction that the child was born to these adoptive parents.20 While this
13. See In re Anonymous, 89 Misc.2d 132, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1976), where
the court describes the many benefits of confidentiality in adoption proceedings. See
also, Klibanoff, Genealogical Information in Adoption: The Adoptee's Quest and
the Law, 11 FAM. L. Q. 185, 188 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Klibanoff.)
14. In re Anonymous, 89 Misc. 132, 132, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 781: "Confidentiality
also protects adopted children who are illegitimate from any possible stigma they
might otherwise have to bear because of their birth."
15. See id.
16. Id. "Sealed records assure that natural parents will not be able to locate
the child and interfere in his relationship with his adoptive parents."
17. But see supra note 10.
18. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.150 (1974); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-104 (1973);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.16.2 (West 1981); Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.120 (1949); MONT.

§ 40-8-126 (1983); N.H. REV.
§ 9:3-31 (West 1976); N.M. STAT.
LAW § 114 (McKinney 1977); OKLA.

§ 170 B:19 (1977); N.J. STAT.
§ 40-7-53 (Supp. 1985); N.Y. DOM.
ANN. tit. 10, § 60.17 (Supp. 1985);

CODE ANN.

STAT. ANN.

ANN.

ANN.

REL.

STAT.

PA. CONS. STAT. § 23-2905 (Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780 (Law. Co-op
1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-15 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 452 (1974);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.330 (Supp. 1985-86); WYO. STAT. § 1-22-104(d) (1977).
19. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-145 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 45-68(e) (1984);

FL. STAT. ANN.

§ 63.162 (1982).

20. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 48.92 (Supp. 1985): "After the order of adoption
is entered the relationship of parent and child between the adopted person and his
birth parents . . . shall be completely altered and all rights, duties and other legal
consequences of the relationship shall cease to exist."
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process has been analogized to giving new birth to the child,"1 it is
more like divorce and remarriage, whereby legal ties binding one set
of persons together are dissolved"2 and a new legally recognized relationship is formed. 23
As in divorce, however, the new remarriage does not alter the
fact that there was a previous spouse. Similarly, nothing can erase
the historical fact of the biological ties between natural parent and
child." ' Providing the child with a brand-new family does not alter
his ethnic makeup or medical history. Further, assuming the child
is at some point told of his adoption, it is likely that nothing will
erase from his awareness the fact that he is not the natural child of
his adoptive parents, as much as he may be theirs in every other
respect. The child may have a close, loving relationship with his adoptive family, and have no intention of serving those ties or of taking
on another set of parents,2 5 yet he may well harbor curiosities about
his natural-parents and about himself.2 6 As an adult, the adoptee may
wish to find the answers to his questions. That is the point at which
the sealed records laws become critical in his life.

III.
A.

THE PARTIES TO ADOPTION

THE ADOPTEE

Closed-record adoption laws were originally implemented with the
express purpose of protecting the best interests of the adoptee.2 7 Most
authorities agree that at the time of the adoption and during the
adoptee's childhood sealed records are in the best interest of the child. 28
The stigma of illegitimacy, though arguably lessening in strength, still
21. Note, Adoption: Sealed Adoption Record Law-Constitutional Violation
or a Need for Judicial Reform? 35 OKLA. L. REV. 575 (1982) (hereinafter cited as
Note, Adoption).
22. The ties binding the biological parent and child are not always completely
dissolved. In some states (e.g. Illinois), biological parents remain liable for the financial
rearing of the child if for some reason the adoptive parents are not able to provide
for him. Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 Ill. 630, 10 N.E.2d 344 (1937).
23. Note, Recognizing the Needs, supra note 6, at 59.

24. See infra note 32.
25. See infra note 74.

26. M. BENET, supra note 9, at 188.
27. See, e.g., Illinois Adoption Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-20(a) (1973):
"The best interests and welfare of the person to be adopted shall be of paramount
consideration in the construction of this Act."
28. See, e.g., Note, Adoption, supra note 21, at 578. For a more thorough
discussion, see
CHILD

(1979).

GOLDSTEIN, FREUD, AND SOLNIT,

BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
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exists in the United States. Sealed adoption records provide adopted
children with the opportunity to develop family ties with their new
adoptive parents, free from interference by curious outsiders or the
biological parents themselves. 9
The very language of the statutes point out the conflict; the "best
interests of the child" language ignores the fact that the child grows
up, and that the statutory schemes enacted to protect his emotional
well-being may now have the opposite effect.3" The psychological needs
of the child, whose welfare depends upon establishing firm, uncomplicated bonds with his adoptive parents, are not the same as those
of the adopted adult intent on discovering the truths about himself.3 '
The language of the statutes fails to take this into account.
Adoptees have the same curiosities about their ancestors as do
all people.3 2 Nearly everyone has at one time constructed a "family
tree." The adoptee lives in the unique position of only being able
to name the most recent, obvious branch of the tree-himself. He
cannot name his ancestors; neither can he pass along to his children
that most common of oral histories-who their grandparents were,
from whom they got their hair or eye color, and other such family
trivia. 3"
The secrecy surrounding the adoptee's past may make this normal curiosity the focus of his self-concept. 3" Psychologists report that
adoptees feel a sense of "genealogical bewilderment,"" and that
29. See supra note 14.
30. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
31. See J. ASKIN, SEARCH xiii (1982), referring to the possibility of a tug-of-

war between the two sets of parents vying for the child:

That's the argument continually raised against efforts on the part of adoptees
and birthparents to reconnect. But there's one thing it ignores in citing the

best interests of the child: There's no child involved per se. As an adoptee
searcher you aren't a child anymore. You're an adult who feels entitled

to know your own background.
32. See In re Maples, 536 S.W.2d 760, 767 (Mo. 1978) Seiler, J., concurring:

"All of us need to know our past, not only for a sense of lineage and heritage,
but for a fundamental and crucial sense of our very selves: our identity is incomplete
and our sense of self retarded without a real personal historical connection."
33. See B. LIFTON, TWICE BORN 4 (1975): "1 say that society by sealing
birth records, by cutting adoptees off from their biological past, by keeping secrets
from them, has made them into a separate breed, unreal even to themselves."
34. J. TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS 39-41 (1973). Triseliotis found
that the more information the adopted person was given about his genetic parents
(especially in childhood) the less likely he was to be painfully preoccupied with their
existence.
35. Klibanoff, supra note 13 at 193; A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN, R. PANNOR, THE
ADOPTION TRIANGLE 96 (1978) (hereinafter cited as SOROSKY).
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adoptees understandably reject arguments that they should forget their
past and accept their rootless status. Research indicates that adoptees
account for a disproportionate percentage of total psychiatric patients.36
It is not difficult to comprehend the adoptee's curiosity. He struggles with nagging "what ifs" to an extent undreamed of by
nonadoptees. If he had not been surrendered for adoption at all, his
life might have been profoundly different. Similarly, his life would
have been quite changed if he had been adopted by another couple.
The unique circumstances that led to the meeting between child and
adoptive parents must be attributed in part to chance. Life is inherently
made up of paths not taken, but the adoptee is uniquely aware of
how easily his life might have been very different.3 7
Nonadoptees take for granted information the adoptee is willing
to fight court battles to discover.38 The adoptee wonders which of
his relatives he looks like, whom he resembles in personality, whether
he has any blood brothers or sisters, and against which diseases he
should be guarding himself."
36. See SOROSKY, supra note 35 at 96. See also Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't
of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646, 655, where the court recognizes
this phenomenon and indicates that "this compelling psychological need may constitute the good cause required" by the New Jersey information statute. See generally,
Hanley, A Reasonable Approach to the Adoptee's Sealed Records Dilemma, 2 QHIO
N.U.L. REV. 542, 547 (1975).
37. One adoptee points out the adoptee's understanding that his life has been
arranged by others: "I also felt that it worked both ways; that there were certain
qualities about me that one set of parents chose, while the other must have rejected
me for the same qualities." SOROSKY, supra note 35, at 88.
38. The nonadopted often have a difficult time understanding the need to search
of the adoptee. Yet, if the adoptee's parents had been killed in a car accident or
some such calamity while the child were still young, society would find the child's
curiosity about his parents quite natural, and might even disapprove of foster parents
who would not share with the child the details of his past. Because the adopted
child knows nothing of his past, he has no tale with which to excite sympathy,
however. Similarly, the nonadopted might be able to better understand were they
to consider their own reaction upon being called by the wrong name. As one commentator has observed:
The involuntary changing of a person's name is indicative of his subservience, as evidenced by the practice of slave owners and traders in the history
of our own country . . . . An individual's name and all that it encompasses, is perhaps more personal and more intimate than anything else he
possesses. To destroy a person's historical identity, which in fact his name
reflects, is to tamper with an important individual psychological and
sociological foundation.
Note, Recognizing the Needs, supra note 6 at 61.
39. See SOROSKY, supra note 35, at 121-39, where the letters and wishes of
many adoptees are poignantly recorded.
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It must be emphasized that these curiosities are inherent in the
adoptee, no matter how successful his adoption may have been. The

adoptee may have a close, loving relationship with his adoptive parents,

yet he may harbor great curiosity about his biological family and what
genetic legacy they may have given him. Also, he cannot help but

wonder what caused his life to begin so differently from the normthat is, why he was surrendered for adoption."0
Adoptees have translated these needs into legal arguments. While
adoptees have asserted that their arguments are universal and warrant opening of adoption records to all adoptees who wish to see
their files, the courts have instead chosen to consider each adoptee's
case individually, determining the strength of the adoptee's "need to
know" and considering the interests of the other parties involved."
Adoptees have urged that they have a number of constitutionallybased rights that are being ignored."2 They have argued that they have

a first amendment "right to know," a corollary to the first amend-

ment right to free speech. 3 The courts have found, however, that
the "right to know" applies to public information only," a category
into which the adoptee's secret records do not easily fall.
Adoptees have also argued a right to privacy, based on the penum-

bras of the first, third, fourth, and ninth amendments of the Constitution. 5 These arguments are based on the premise that the right
of privacy over the facts of one's life must also include the right

to control those facts." Unfortunately for adoptees, courts have either
40. See supra note 32, see infra note 74.
41. For a discussion of the interests of the other parties involved, see infra
notes 53-78 and accompanying text.
42. For a good general discussion of the constitutional issues involved, see Note,
Sealed Adoption Records and the Constitutional Right of Privacy of the Natural
Parent, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 451 (1982); Note, Adoption, supra note 21.
43. Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
437 U.S. 904 (1978); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978); Mills v. Atlantic
City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646 (1977).
44. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the
rights of the public to hear broadcasts of all sides of public issues); but see Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that a "right to know" extended to private
possession of pornographic materials).
45. Yesterday's Children, 569 F.2d at 431.
46. The Supreme Court has found a constitutional right to privacy based on
the penumbras of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). This right has been held to extend to
such issues as marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); abortion, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); and education, Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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found that their right to privacy does not exist,"7 or that it is rightly
subordinated to the privacy rights of the parents."8
The final constitutional argument is based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 9 Adoptees argue that it
is unfair to deny them access to records which nonadoptees can obtain merely by asking. However, in equal protection cases not involving a suspect class or a fundamental right, the "rational basis" standard is applied by the courts."0 The rational basis standard carries
a strong presumption in favor of the validity of the legislation, one
that the adoptees are not likely to overcome."
It seems the courts are unlikely to find a constitutionally-based
right for an adoptee to see his birth records. As mentioned, the courts
tend to handle adoption records searches on a case by case basis,
weighing the pertinent facts of each situation. 52
B. THE BIRTH PARENTS

It is not difficult to see why biological parents might prefer that
sealed records laws do not change. In the adoption setting, biological
"parents" often consist solely of a young woman, pregnant and unmarried. 5 3 Faced with the calamity of an unwanted pregnancy, she
turns to adoption to provide a solution for both her and her child.
She may well wish to put the entire incident behind her once the proceedings are over; certainly it will have been a painful experience for
her, no matter what the circumstances leading to the adoption decision were. 5 ' Once many years have passed, it is possible that she has

47. Mills, 148 N.J. Super 302, 372 A.2d 646.
48. Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 763.
49. Alma Society Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979); Yesterday's
Children, 569 F.2d 631.
50. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1960); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1973).
51. Adoptees have also argued that "adoptee" is a suspect classification, like
race, as established in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966), or ancestry, as established in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), because it is one over
which the person has no control. The state should thus be forced to meet a "strict
scrutiny" standard. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-87 (1973). But unlike
race or ancestry, the status of adoptee is not acquired at birth but by means of
a statutory process intended to elevate, rather than lower, the child's status, presumably
from that of illegitimate to adoptee. It is unlikely that the adoptee will win a strict
scrutiny approach by way of the suspect classification doctrine.
52. See infra notes 53-78 and accompanying text.
53. SOROSKv, supra note 35, at 47.
54. See Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763 (1978). The court recognized the birth
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begun a new family and a new life, and she may have kept her earlier
pregnancy a secret from those with whom she now lives.5 5
Biological parents have two legal arguments on their side. First,
they were promised confidentiality by the state, 56 and they have a
contractual interest in seeing that privacy maintained. Second, courts
have found that the natural parents have a constitutionally based
privacy interest in maintaining sealed records." It should be noted
that courts have also indicated that the adoptee has a privacy interest
that conflicts directly with that of the parents. 8 However, these same
courts have found that the parents' interest outweighs that of the
adoptees."
Upon further examination of the privacy issue, a heretofore
unasked question arises: to whom does the information in the records
belong? The courts have never addressed themselves to this question,
and yet the issue of who should be allowed to exercise control over
the information contained within necessarily depends on a determination of who "owns" the facts. Even if the information contained
in the records does belong primarily to the biological parents, it is
not clear that their privacy interest vis-a-vis the general public necessarily conflicts with the adoptee's limited interest in opening the records,
not publicly, but only to himself.
While it is reasonable that the state should seek to protect the
birth parents' privacy, it is less apparent why the state should so inflexibly protect this particular secret and no others.6 Presumably, the
state seeks to help the natural mother keep the fact of the birth from
62
her new family, friends, and neighbors.6 1 Yet record of a past divorce,

parents' interest in secrecy.

55. Id. The court further discussed the possibility that the birth mother may
have begun a new life, a life that could be destroyed by disclosure of the identity
of the adopted child.

56. See supra note 8.

57. Mills, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646; Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760. For

a full discussion of the constitutional rights of the natural parents, see Note, Sealed

Adoption Records and the Constitutional Right of Privacy of the Natural Parent,
34 RUTGERS L. REV. 451 (1982).

58. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.

59. Mills, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646, Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760.
60. Heyden, Seal of Sorrow, 19 HUMAN RIGHTS 28 (1981).

61. See Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 320, 372 A.2d at 655-56, where the court

recounts the story of one marital breakup because of the unexpected appearance

of the adopted child years after he was surrendered for adoption.
62. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 333.2864 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 5004 (1966).
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of venereal disease,6 3 of criminal conduct6 ' and of other aspects of
her life are not kept secret, though arguably these facts are as damaging
(or more so) to her reputation. In each of these instances, the state
has determined that it will not protect the unhappy secrets of its
citizens' past when there are pressing reasons for disclosure. That
reasoning applies with equal force in the case of adoption records.
Most importantly, it must be noted that the commonly held belief
that birth parents wish to remain anonymous may be a misconception. 6" Many birth parents have actually initiated searches for the
hildren they gave up.66 According to one study, the majority of both
parents are in favor of open adoption records. 67 If these statistics
are representative, and neither the adoptees nor the birth parents oppose opening birth records to adult adoptees, very little justification
remains in favor of sealing them forever.
C. THE ADOPTIVE PARENTS
The position of the adoptive .parents is especially vulnerable. They
have neither the contract and privacy arguments of the biological
parents, nor the emotional pull of the adoptees' position.6" Nonetheless,
the adoptive parents clearly see their interests threatened in the sealed
records controversy. They fear that their relationship with their adopted
child will be negatively altered by the child's developing interest in
his natural parents. After eighteen or more years as their child's only
parents, they do not wish to lose their place in his life. 69
Psychologists have tied the adoptive parents' strong fear of open
63. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5213 (1978).
64. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Superior Court of Arizona, 142 Ariz. 332, 690 P.2d
51 (1984); Louisiana Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-1370 (1977).
65. SOROSKY, supra note 35. Their study found that 82% of the natural parents
surveyed were interested in a reunion with their natural child. Id. at 53.
66. Klibanoff, supra note 13, at 195.
67. SoRosKY, supra note 35 at 54; M. BENET, THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION
188 (1976), quoting an official of the British Home Office who keeps track of letters
to Parliament on this issue: "The letters we get have been reflecting the fear of
the adoptive parents that the adolescent child might reject them; the natural mothers
haven't been speaking up about this at all." Benet further points out that a "successful search not only eases their (the adoptees') identity crises but can be deeply
relieving to natural mothers as well." Id.
68. See Mills, 372 A.2d at 649 (1977): "The State has an obligation to protect
the interests of this voiceless party."
69. See SOROSKY, supra note 35, at 83, quoting an adoptive mother: "We did
not adopt our children to be caretakers or babysitters for the natural mothers who
gave them up for adoption."
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adoption records to the parents' original motives to adopt."0 Many
couples who decide to adopt do so because they are unable to conceive. Their grief and unhappiness over the children they cannot bear
follows them all their lives. 7' Upon submitting themselves to the adoption process, they are open to a battery of personal questions from
social workers and judges who probe every part of their lives, until
they themselves may have doubts about their ability to raise someone
else's child.72 Even when allowed to take a child home they are subject to a "trial" period, during which time the child can be taken

from them. It seems natural that they would become fearful of losing their child. 73
Many adoptive parents would prefer to forget that the child had

any parents but themselves. They believe that any interest on the part
of their child in his natural parents is an indication that the child
is unhappy, and that the interest might cause the adoptive parents
to lose him.' They view themselves as the child's only parents, and
disagree when birth parents, courts, and legislatures see the birth

parents as an integral part of the child's life."

70. Id. at 73-78. The authors cite several reasons as the most common motivations to adopt: sterility, repeated miscarriages, replacement of another child who
died, pity for the homeless child, desire to have more children after childbearing
age, and taking care of relatives' orphaned children. Id. at 73. The authors point
out that parents who adopt as a reaction to a negative experience-sterility, for
example-need especially to examine their psychological readiness to accept a child
not their own. Id. at 74.
71. Id. The authors indicate that persons who discover they are infertile go
through a period of mourning not unlike that relating to death. They assert that
the adoptive parents' difficulty in accepting their child's need to search "stems from
a resurgence of the old preadoption childless feeling of failure, deprivation, separations, and loss." Id. at 85.
72. The screening process for adoptive parents has been described as "going
through the wringers of a washing machine." Id. at 75.
73. Id. at 76-77.
74. SoRosKY, supra note 35, at 85. However, this belief is contrary to findings
by many sociologists. See, e.g., SoRosKY, supra note 35, at 73-86; See also Note,
Sealed Records in Adoption: The Need for Legislative Reform, 21 CATH. LAWY.
211, 223-25, n.76 (1975). Courts have also come to recognize the universality of
the adoptee's curiosity. See, e.g., In re Dixon, 116 Mich. App. 763, 323 N.W.2d
549, 552 (1982), quoting a psychiatrist: "There is a generally deep-seated need
on the part of adoptees to know their biological origins, regardless of the quality
of family life in their adopted families." See also, Mills, 372 A.2d at 654: "More
and more adoptees daily are beginning to realize that their desire to meet their natural
parents is not unusual nor does it have any reflection on their relationship with their
adoptive parents whom they may love dearly."
75. SOROSKY, supra note 35, at 83. One adoptive mother is quoted as saying
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During their child's youth, the adoptive parents are properly given
the right to determine how much information about the child's adoption and birth parents the child should receive. 76 They determine what
is in the child's best interest." The argument of the adoptee is that
once the adoptee reaches adulthood, his parents no longer have the
right to protect him from his own past; neither do they have the right
to keep from him information fundamentally his in order to protect
their own position in his life.
Most important, the adoptive parents should be helped to realize
that their place in their child's life is a permanent one. As one adoptive mother stated:
He has "another" mother somewhere, but I am his Mother. He
will have no memories of her-she was not there to comfort him
when he was sick. She was not there when his fingers were slammed
in the door. She will not be there for his first day of school or
for his graduation ....

Why should we feel threatened? .

.

. Love for

one individual does not diminish because we love another individual."8
D.

THE STATE

The state has several interests in this controversy, some of which
are conflicting. Closed record laws attempt to accomplish three basic
goals: (1) to protect the welfare of the child above all else; (2) to
protect the adoptive family the state has created; and (3) to ensure
the integrity of the adoption process."
The state finds itself in a dilemma regarding its treatment of the
adopted child's interests. The adoption records were originally sealed
because the child needed a stable environment in which to grow up.8
The state has pledged itself to the protection of the "best interests"
of the child.' But when that child is an adult he may no longer wish
that she and her husband never intended "to be caretakers or babysitters for the
natural mothers." Id.
76. SOROSKY, supra note 35 at 84: "Who has a better right to uncensored and

complete information about the child than the adoptive parents who are going to

raise that child?"

77. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that parents
have the ultimate right to make decisions regarding their children's education).
78. SOROSKY, supra note 35, at 81.

79. See In re Roger B., 84 1ll.2d 323, 418 N.E.2d 751 (1981); In re Anonymous,

89 Misc.2d 132, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1976) (describing the benefits confidentiality con-

fers on all adoption parties).
80. See supra note 13.
81. See supra note 27.
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to be protected in the same manner.82 The state must realize that
it also has an interest in the mental health of its citizens, including
its adopted adults.83 If adopted adults are psychologically wounded
by the sealing process, the state is not fulfilling its intended goal of
protecting the adoptee. What might have been in the best interests
of the adoptee as a child may now be causing him serious emotional
damage.
The state also has an interest in protecting its families.8" It has
been argued that the adoptive family unit will be damaged by the
adoptee's access to his birth records. First, it must be pointed out
that sociological evidence shows that the adoptive family may actually
be benefitted if the adoptee is given access to the records. 5 In many
cases, long-time doubts on the part of the adoptee are resolved and
he is better able to view his adoptive parents in their true role as
his real parents. 6
Second, although the adoptive family may be hurt by the adoptee's
interest in his natural family, once that adoptee is an adult it is his
right, just as it is the right of nonadopted people, to continue or
terminate his relationship with his family as he sees fit. Strong argument can be made that adoptive parents are not guaranteed the love
and attention of their children any more than are other parents.
The state also has an interest in the integrity of the adoption
process itself.8 7 Despite dire predictions that birth parents will stop
choosing adoption over abortion if the records are opened,88 logic
also suggests that as many women might choose adoption over abortion if they felt that they were not necessarily losing all contact forever
with the child when they surrendered him. The existence of "open"
82. In re Roger B., 84 l1.2d 323, 333, 418 N.E.2d 751, 755 (1981): "Upon
majority, the adoptee often develops a countervailing interest that is in direct conflict with the other parties, particularly the natural parents."
83. Id. at 332, 418 N.E.2d at 755: "The public also has an interest in the
mental health of children who have been adopted ... in order that they not become
burdens to society."
84. Id. at 332, 418 N.E.2d at 755: "The adoptive parents need and deserve
the child's loyalty as they grow older, and particularly in their later years."
85. SOROSKY, supra note 35, at 222: "Regardless of what kind of relationship,
postive or negative, existed between the adoptee and adoptive parents prior to the
reunion, the effect of the experience was in some way enhancing to that relationship."
86. Id. "Solving the unknown mysteries made it possible for the adoptee to
be better able to accept the real value of the adoptive family relationship."
87. Klibanoff, supra note 13, at 196-97.
88. Note, Adoption: Sealed Adoption Record Laws-Constitutional Violation
or a Need for Judicial Reform? 35 OKLA. L. REV. 575, 580, 582 (1982).
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adoption, where visitation by the natural parents is allowed after the
adoption takes place,89 and the rising popularity of private adoptions,
which allow the birth parents to choose the adoptive family for their
child, 90 suggest that some birth parents have chosen adoption over

other alternatives when, and perhaps because, relinquishment of the

child did not mean complete loss of contact. Data from Finland, Great
Britain, and Israel, where records were recently opened to adopted
adults, suggest that fears of a drop in the supply of babies for adoption are unfounded. 9 ' The fact that some states provide adult adoptees
with their birth records as a matter of course 92 also suggests that sealed

records are not essential to the maintenance of a functioning adoption system.
IV.

THE STATUTES INVOLVED

In an effort to compromise, the states have enacted various
statutory schemes which attempt to balance the interests of the parties involved, and to provide a standardized process for handling requests for information from birth parents and adoptees.
A.

THE GOOD CAUSE APPROACH

Sixteen states employ the most conservative approach, the "good
cause" standard. 93 In these states, a party to an adoption who wishes
to see any information contained in the sealed records must show
good cause to persuade the court to open the records. Louisiana has
a similar scheme, except the required standard is phrased "compelling reasons." 9 Of all these, four states have also enacted a separate
provision allowing for the release of medically needed information
without the strict requirement of showing good cause.95 Two states
89. Katz, Rewriting the Adoption Story, 5 FAM. ADV. 9, 10 (1982).
90. Charney, The Rebirth of Private Adoptions, 71 A.B.A.J. 52 (1985).
91. SOROSKY, supra note 35, at 224.
92. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 18 for a listing of good cause states.
94. The Louisiana statute provides:
Except as provided in R.S. 40:74, this sealed package shall be opened
• . only by order of a Louisiana court of competent jurisdiction at the
domicile of the division of vital records, which said court order shall issue
only after a showing of compelling reasons and opened only to the extent
necessary to satisfy such compelling necessity.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.73(b) (West Supp. 1985) (footnote omitted).
95. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170:B:19 Ila (Supp. 1983); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 9:3-41.1 (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.340-350 (1985); Wyo. STAT.
§ 1-22-116 (Supp. 1985).

1986:103]

SEALED ADOPTION RECORDS

employ the good cause standard but will allow nonidentifying infor96
mation to be divulged more readily.
Ten states require a court order to open the records. 97 These
statutes do not indicate what standard must be met to obtain the
court order, but the good cause approach appears to be the one utilized
in interpreting the statutes. 9 Maine, one of the court order states,
takes a particularly unusual approach. Normally, adoption records
can be obtained only if a court order is issued. However, if both
birth parents are dead and the adoptee had lived with them for at
least five years before he was surrendered for adoption, he may see
the records. 99 This is the only state that differentiates between persons adopted as infants, with presumably no memory of their natural
parents, and those who may have been old enough at the time of
the adoption to have retained some memory of their birth parents.
Maryland has no statutory provision addressing the adoptee's interest in opening the records. 0° Since no cases have been adjhldicated
in Maryland in this area, the Maryland standard is unknown.
The twenty-seven above-mentioned states (if Maryland is included)
require the adoptee to make a showing of "good cause" to gain access to his records. The good cause standard has recently come under
strong criticism.' 0 Its supposed purpose is to establish the necessary
standard in order to gain access to adoption records, and to provide
a method of balancing the interests of the parties involved in an adoption. Its success in accomplishing these goals is debatable.
A major problem with the good cause standard is that courts
vary a great deal in their interpretation of what constitutes good cause.
A clear definition has never surfaced. For instance, Illinois courts
have repeatedly stated that psychological need alone does not con-

1976).

96. IOWA CODE § 600.16 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780 (Law. Co-op.

97. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-120 (West Supp. 1974-84); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-8-18 (1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 578.15 (1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-5 (Supp.
1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.570 (1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2765 (1979);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 13 (West Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-63

(Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-3-23 (1985); VA. CODE § 32.1-261 (Supp. 1984).
98. In re Christine, 397 A.2d 511 (R.I. 1979).
99. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2766 (Supp. 1983).
100. See Maryland Adoption Code, MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 5-301-

5-415 (1984). However, Maryland has recently implemented a statute allowing an
adoptee access to his birth parents' medical histories if a court so orders. MD. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 5-329 (1984).
101. See, e.g., Klibanoff, supra note 13; Note, A Step Toward Resolving the
Adoption Records Controversy: The Adoption Agency as the Key to Unlocking Secret
Identities, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 350, 364-69 (1970).
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stitute good cause.' °2 However, in New York' 3 and Washington,
D.C.,' °4 psychological curiosity has been declared sufficiently
compelling.
An adoptee in genuine need of medical information may or may
not be allowed access to his records. For example, a New York court
held that a woman's fear that she had been exposed to DES, a drug
once prescribed to combat risk of miscarriage and now thought to
increase the risk of cancer in those children whose mothers took the
drug while pregnant, constituted good cause.' 5 However, a Missouri
appellate court rejected a man's application to see his records despite
the fact that his search was motivated by his having contracted an
acute form of leukemia, and although undisputed medical testimony
indicated that his best chance of surviving was to find a bone marrow donor to whom he was biologically related.' 6
In a classic Catch-22 of adoption law, the right to an interstate
inheritance has been found not to constitute good cause." ' Several
states,"' 8 including Illinois,"' 9 provide that adoption does not cut off
the child's right to inherit from his natural relatives. Indeed, in some
states the only non-parental relatives from whom he can inherit are
natural relatives.'' 0 If the child knows who his natural relatives are,
he is entitled to make a claim against their estates if they should die
intestate.''' Ironically, he is not allowed to find out who the relatives
are because the courts have held that possible inheritance rights do
not constitute good cause sufficient to gain access to the records. This
reading of the good cause requirement effectively invalidates the
adoptee's property right, a right guaranteed in the state's own probate code.'' 2
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
573 (La.
108.

In re Roger B., 84 1l1.2d 323, 418 N.E.2d 751 (1981).
In re Anonymous, 92 Misc.2d 224, 399 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1977).
In re CAB, 384 A.2d 679 (D.C. 1978).
In re Hayden, 106 Misc.2d 849, 435 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1981).
See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
Massey v. Parker, 369 So.2d 1310 (La. 1979); Spillman v. Parker, 332 So.2d
Ct. App. 1976).
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-4-3 (1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-109 (Supp.
1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 448 (1974).
109. In re Cregar's Estate, 30 111.
App.3d 798, 333 N.E.2d 540 (1975).
110. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Robertson, 615 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).
111. See, e.g., Estate of Tilliski, 390 111.273, 61 N.E.2d 24 (1944), aff'g 323
111.
App. 490, 56 N.E.2d 481 (1945).
112. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1968).
For further reading on inheritance and adoptees, including a list of case citations,

see generally Comment, The Adopted Child's Inheritance from Natural Intestate
Parents, 55 IOWA L. REV. 739 (1970).
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The good cause standard has been applied neither evenly nor rationally across the United States. It fails in its attempt to provide
the adoptee with guidelines as to what he must allege in order to,
convince the court of the necessity of his seeing his records. The good
cause standard also fails in its attempt to balance the interests of
the parties involved. Most important is the fact that courts have felt
free-even obliged-to consider the weight of the adoptee's interest
with no reference to the actual interests of the other parties involved." 3
Thus the real, present needs of the adoptee are being "balanced"
against the theoretical needs of the natural parents."' Courts then
typically decide that the adoptee's interest is not as strong as that
of the parents, when it is quite possible that the parents have no objection to opening the records at all.'' 5 The state's failure to ascertain the actual wishes of the parents may prevent the adoptee from
seeing his records, to his detriment and to no one's benefit.
The good cause standard, as interpreted, works another wrong
against the adoptee. Good cause standards have been used to prevent
the adoptee from seeing information that presumably was not intended
to be kept secret.. The problem lies in the fact that, of the eleven
good cause states, only six"16 recognize that the adoption records con-

tain much information that does not identify the birth parents. Along
with the names and addresses of the parties involved, adoption records
contain much background information: the nationality of the parents
and child, general physical descriptions, personality characteristics, and
similar details.' Most adoptees seek only background information
about themselves." 8 The release of this information, as it does not
identify anyone, could not threaten anyone's privacy, and could help
the adoptee gain an understanding of himself. Yet, because of a
legislative omission and the court's reluctance to re-interpret the
statutes, this information is often as inaccessible to the adoptee as
113. See Hayden, 106 Misc.2d 849, where the court held that good cause should
be determined before considering the desires of the natural parents.
114. See In re Dixon, 116 Mich. App. 763, 323 N.W.2d 549, 551 (1982): "The
biological parents' interest must be considered based upon conjecture, as they will
never be before the court. .. "
115. See supra notes 65-67.
116. IOWA CODE § 600.16 (1980) (nonidentifying information is released on request); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170:B:19 Ila (Supp. 1983) (medical history); N.J.
REV. STAT. § 9:3-41.1 (Supp. 1985) (medical history of birth parents released on request); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780 (1981) (nonidentifying information); WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.33.340-350 (Supp. 1985) (medical history); Wyo. STAT. § 1-22-116 (1977)
(medical history).
117. See infra note 142.
118. J. TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS 39-40 (1973).
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is the critical information around which the controversy rightly
revolves.
The good cause standard fails in its attempt to provide a
reasonable standard for the adoptee to meet and in its attempt to
balance the interests of the parties. Often, it balances nothing, for
it neither considers the actual desires of the adoptee (especially when
he is only searching for nonidentifying information), nor looks to
the actual desires of the birth parents involved. For precisely these
reasons, several states have recently altered their adoption codes to
better provide for the needs of the parties involved.
B. THE "BEST INTEREST" STANDARD

Two states (North Carolina and Tennessee) employ statutes that
allow for the opening of adoption records when it will be in the "best
interests of the child or the public."" 9 While this suggests a standard
that would place great value on the interests of the adoptee, the North
Carolina court held in In Re Spinks'20 that in spite of the legislative
language, a balancing of the interests of the parties involved was
necessary.' 2 ' The court went a step further and decided that, notwithstanding the "best interests" concept, the burden of persuasion
was on the adoptee, and disclosure would be prohibited except in
cases of "compelling need." The court then denied the adoptee access to her birth records, despite the court's finding that she had a
"disturbed emotional and mental outlook as a result of not being
able to ascertain the true identity of her natural parents," and despite
the fact that her adoptive parents (one of the parties the court was
trying to protect) wholeheartedly supported her search for her natural
parents.' 2 2 Furthermore, no evidence was offered to suggest that the
birth parents were in opposition to Nancy's search, for they were never
contacted and their interests were never ascertained.' 23 The court found
that, notwithstanding the "best interests" concept, disclosure of adoption information is prohibited except in "compelling" cases.' 24
This formulation of the "best interest" scheme offers no greater
benefit to the parties involved than does the good cause standard.
Like the good cause standard, the "best interests" approach fails to
provide consistent standards for the adoptee and fails in its attempt
to actually balance the interests of the parties involved.
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-26 (Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-131 (1984).

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

32 N.C. App. 422, 232 S.E.2d 479 (N.C. 1977).
232 S.E.2d at 482.
Id.at 480.

Id.
Id. at 482.
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Delaware and Washington, D.C. have statutes similar to the "best
interest" standard, but they are worded differently.' 2 5 To date, these
statutes have prompted no litigation, so it is difficult to predict whether
they will be interpreted in the same manner as the good cause stan-

dard or whether a new balancing test will be employed.
C.

CONSENT STATES

statutes. 2 6 Typically,

Twenty-one states have enacted "consent"

biological parents are given the chance to manifest their consent to
the release of identifying information, either at the time of the adoption or later upon their own initiative.' 27 Likewise, the adult adoptee

is allowed to manifest in writing his consent to release of identifying

information about himself.' 2 8 Consent can be revoked by either party
at any time.' 2 9 A central registry for recording consents is maintained
by the state.' 30

125.

DEL. CODE ANN.

tit.

13,

§§ 1111, 924, 925 (Supp. 1984), providing that

identifying information will be released only when in the best interest of the child
and the interests of the adoptive and biological parents will not be prejudiced; D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-311 (1981), providing that adoption records are to be sealed unless
the welfare of the child would be protected or promoted by opening the records.

126. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-144 (1985); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 227 (Supp. 1985);
COLO. REV. STAT. 25.3.113.5 (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. 45-68(e) (1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 63.162 (1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1522 (Supp. 1984); MICH.

§ 710.68 (Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. § 259.49 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 43-124 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.007 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-53 (1985);

COMP. LAWS

N.Y. PuB.

HEALTH LAW §

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

(1983);

(1981);

PA. CONS. STAT.

TENN. CODE ANN.
STAT.

(Vernon 1983); WIs.

127. See, e.g., ILL.

4138 (1983); N.D.

CENT. CODE §

14-15-16 (Supp. 1985);

§ 3107.41 (Page Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.425-500
§ 23-2905 (Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15.3

§

CODE ANN. § 40.001-.023
VA. CODE § 48-4-10 (1984).

36-141 (1985); TEX. HUM. RES.

§ 48.433 (West Supp. 1985); W.

REV. STAT.

ch. 40, § 1522.1(b) (Supp. 1984): "At any time

during the adoption proceedings or at any time thereafter, either biological parent

of both of them may file with the Registry a Biological Parent Registration Identification Form and an Information Exchange Authorization."
128. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1522.1(c) (Supp. 1984):
Any adoptee may file with the Registry an Adoptee Registration Identification Form and an Information Exchange Authorization if such adoptee is
21 years of age or over; or, if over 18 years of age and under 21 years
of age, if there is attached to the Information Exchange Authorization (consent of the adoptive parents or guardian).
129. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1522.1(e) (Supp. 1984): "Any adoptee
or biological parent may revoke a Denial of Information Exchange Authorization.
The Department of Public Health shall act in accordance with the most recently
filed Authorization."
130. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1522.1(a) (Supp. 1984).
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If one of the parties contacts the registry requesting identifying
information regarding the other party, registry personnel will check
to see whether consent has been given. If a match is made, the information will be released. If no match is found, the state may require
the adoptee to petition the court for the information, 3 ' or it may
deny him the information as a matter of course.' 3 2 At least three states
have similar registries pertaining to biological siblings.' 3 3
This scheme attempts to balance more equitably the interests of
the actual parties involved, thereby avoiding one of the major problems with the good cause standard. The flaw in the system is that
it is based on voluntary response from the birth parents. The states
allow for the fact that at the time of the adoption, the birth parents
may not wish to give consent but that they may change their minds
later. However, only natural parents who are sufficiently compelled
to do so will express any opinion as to consent. No attempt is made
to ascertain the wishes of those birth parents who do not come forth
on their own initiative.' 34 Many birth parents, especially those who
surrendered their children long before the development of consent
registries, may not be aware of the provisions for recording their consent. It is probable that many birth parents in these states do not
realize that their silence may mean that their child will be prevented
from seeing his records,' and that they may not even be made aware
of his wish to do so.
At least two of the consent states have overcome this flaw by
requiring the state to locate the biological parents and ascertain their
willingness to consent when the adoptee seeks access to his records.' 36
This scheme more fairly provides for the interests of all parties involved. The biological parents are given the opportunity to express
their actual desires, and adoptees are not prevented from seeing records
that no one wants closed merely because the adoptee's search for his
parents turned up silence as to their consent.
In all consent states, the biological parents' refusal to consent
amounts to a dead end for the adoptee. Generally, he will now be
131. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-53 (1985).
132. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1522.3(e) (Supp. 1984);

TENN. CODE

§ 36-1-139 (Supp. 1985): "If, for any reason, the biological parents object,
then no information contained in the sealed adoption records shall be disclosed."
133. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.575 (1982) (Kentucky does not have a consent
registry pertaining to the birth parents); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-139 (1956); TEX.
HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 49.018 (Vernon 1984).
134. At least two of the consent states provide that the court must at least atANN.

tempt to find the natural parents and ascertain their wishes: N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-15-16 (Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. 48.433(6)(a) (West Supp. 1985).
135. Michigan is the exception. See infra note 153.

136. See supra note 134.
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required to meet the good cause standard as described above.' 37 It
can be assumed that his birth parents' refusal to consent will be given
strong consideration by the court. Good cause is rarely found even
in cases where no such refusal to consent is present; presumably, good
cause will be found even less frequently in cases of parental refusal.
The adoptee is again faced with all the problems of the good cause
system, and his case is even further weakened by this new factor.
Some states indicate that if consent is denied, the adoptee has
no recourse to the courts. The natural parent is not required to explain denial, and no balancing of the interests of the parties ever occurs.' 38 While the consent statutes in general are a step forward in
the direction of recognition of the actual wishes of the parties, overly
rigid schemes remove even the minimal balancing provided by the
old good cause statutes.
D.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR NONIDENTIFYING INFORMATION

Another statutory scheme represents a great improvement over
the rigid good cause scheme and its cousins, and has generated little
controversy. Thirty states have responded to public and legal criticism
and have created a statutory distinction between identifying information
and non-identifying information. In these states, adoptees who seek
will be allowed to see
only background " or medical'"" information
4
'
course.'
of
matter
a
as
this information
137. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.433(9) (1981): "The requester may petition the court to disclose any information that may not be disclosed under this section. The court shall grant the petition for good cause shown." Some states require
a court order to open the records after consent is denied, but do not specify the
standard that must be met-see, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.007 (1979); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15.3 (1981).
138. See supra note 132.
139. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-121,129 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-145
(1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-68(e) (West 1984); FLA. STAT. § 63.162 (1980); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 40 § 1522.4 (Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE § 600.16 (West 1980); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.68 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-53 (1985); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4138 (Consol. Supp. 1984); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. 3107.17
(Page 1985); OR. REV. STAT. 109.500 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48:25 (1984); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-15-16 (1983); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. 2905 (Purdon 1984); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-1780 (Law. Co-op. 1980); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15.2 (1985);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-140, 36-1-141 (1985); TEX. FAM. CODE § 16.032 (Vernon
1983); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-10 (1984).
140. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 924,925 (1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-8-18 (1984);
IND. CODE § 31-3-4-14 (West 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422.13 (West 1979);
MD. FAM.

LAW CODE ANN.

§

5-329 (1984); ME. REV.

STAT. ANN.

tit. 19,

§

534

(1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-128 (1980); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170:B:19 (1973);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.340,350 (1985); WIs. STAT. § 48.93, 48.432 (West 1981);
WYo. STAT. § 1-22-116 (1977).

141. During the youth of the adoptee, the adoptive parents are also given the

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

These changes are a vast improvement over the rigidity of the
plain good cause rule, where the inability of the adoptee to show
cause sufficient to justify full disclosure may also prevent him from
seeing information that it disadvantages no one to divulge. A few
statutes specifically delineate the specific kinds of information to which
the adoptee is freely entitled. These include the age, education, heritage,
physical appearance, talents and interests, religion, health history, and
occupations of the genetic parents, and the existence of other siblings, the reasons for relinquishment of the child, and the relationship
between the genetic parents.' 4
While the nonidentifying information enactments are a positive
change from the old good cause standard, there remains room for
criticism. Many of the states providing easier access to medical information make no such provision for nonmedical nonidentifying information, release of which would be equally harmless.'" 3 New Jersey
and Pennsylvania statutes provide access to medical records only to
the adoptive parents; " if the adult adoptee should seek his medical
history, he is prevented from seeing it, though his adoptive parents
have relatively free access. The law should not require the adult adoptee
to ask his adoptive parents for his own medical background. Moreover,
if the adoptive parents are no longer living, the adoptee may be forever
barred from access to his own medical records. Such rigid schemes
harm the adoptee while benefitting no one.
E.

OPEN STATES

Finally, there are a few states, labeled "open states," that seal
adoption records while the adoptee is a juvenile, but provide that
upon legal age the adoptee need only petition the court for his adoption records and they will be provided.' 4 5 These states fail to make
any provision to protect the privacy of the birth parents once the
adoptee has reached adulthood, nor do they attempt to balance the
interests of the particular parties at hand. They represent the evils
of an overly rigid good cause standard in reverse, and lack even a
provision for a judicial hearing which the good cause standard provides. While this comment argues that the adoptee's interest should
right to access this information.
142. See, e.g., CONN. GEN STAT. § 45-68(e) (1984).
143. See, e.g., Indiana, Maryland, and New Hampshire provisions, supra note
140.
144. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2905 (Purdon 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1
(1979).

145. See supra note 10.
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take preference over the interests of the birth parents in most circumstances, there may exist situations in which it is preferable to protect
the privacy of the parents. The answer to the adoption records problem will not be solved by a rigid formula, whomever it is intended
to protect.
V.

A PROPOSED SOLUTION

A statutory (or common law) scheme that would be truly satisfactory would consider both birth parents and adoptees alike. It would
provide a forum where the court could hear the actual stories of the
people involved. Its balancing scale would lean to the adoptee's side,
for it is he who had no voice in the original proceedings, and if he
suffers, it is not as a result of any action of his own for which he
must now realize the consequences. All other things being equal, the
adoptee's interest would be protected most defensively.
Two states have implemented such a system: New Jersey,"46
through court interpretation of its good cause statute, and Michigan,""
through a statutory scheme. These states employ a shifting burden
of proof. While the adoptee is in his childhood and adolescence, the
records will rarely, if ever, be opened. Once the adoptee reaches
adulthood, the presumption shifts in his favor. If there are no persuasive factors to the contrary, the adoptee will be given all the information pertaining to him as a matter of course.
New Jersey arrived at this scheme by way of interpreting its good
cause statute in Mills v. Atlantic City Dept. of Vital Statistics.'"8 The
court first approved its present good cause standard for minor
adoptees.'" 9 The court said that the child seeking to open the records
must sustain the burden of persuasion, and "that burden of proof
should be a heavy one."'' 0 Once the child reaches majority, the burden
shifts to the state to show that good cause is not present. The court
also indicated that, among other factors, "compelling psychological
need" would constitute good cause.'"' In other words, if an adoptee
approaches the court with a strong psychological need or another equally valid basis for his "desire to know," the state has the burden of
showing why he should not have access to his records.

146. Mills, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646 (1977).
147. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.68 (West 1982).
148.
149.
150.
151.

148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646 (1977).
Id., 372 A.2d at 654.
Id.
Id. at 655.
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Similarly, Michigan employs a shifting burden of proof in its
adoption records process, but does so pursuant to statute. Michigan
is a "consent" state.' Unlike the other consent states, however,
Michigan law states that persons adopted after 1980 may obtain their
adoption records as long as the biological parents have not filed a
written request that identifying information not be released.' 53 Unlike
the other consent states, which require affirmative action on the part
of the birth parents in order to open the records, Michigan presumes
consent, and requires the birth parents to act only if they oppose
disclosure of the records. The virtue of this system is that it balances
and provides for the rights of both parties. Biological parents are
given an opportunity to express their opinion, yet the system shifts
the advantage of passivity to the adoptee, the party who had no voice
in the original decision to make the information secret. Since the
adoptee clearly has gone to some length to express his wishes, the
birth parents must put forth some effort if their desires are to be
given preference over those of the adoptee. If the biological parents
truly oppose disclosure, Michigan provides a forum for them to speak
and to maintain their privacy at the same time.
Once the parties have spoken, if they are in disagreement over
the disclosure, stronger weight should be given to the adoptee's needs
than to those of the birth parents, for the parents had a choice in
the original adoption that the adoptee was not given-the option of
anonymity. The birth parents freely contracted away their right to
know who their child is, but the adoptee's rights were signed away
for him by his adoptive parents and the state. Compelling reasons
for continued privacy should still be given full weight, but cases in
which anonymity is protected should be the exception. If coupled with
provisions for releasing nonidentifying personal and medical information to the young adoptee and to his parents, a scheme of this
sort would adequately provide a forum for all parties to voice their
concerns, and for the courts to properly balance the interests of the
actual parties involved.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The fifty states are far from agreement about opening adoption
records for adoptees who wish to learn about their past. Some states
maintain a strict, court-balanced weighing process, supposedly intended
to balance the interests of the parties involved, but which in practice
152. See supra notes 126-138 and accompanying text.

153.

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

§ 710.68 (West 1985).
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prevents the adoptee from seeing his records in all but the rarest of
situations. Many states still fail to provide medical and other nonidentifying information to adoptees on a regular basis.
In some states, the birth parents are given the opportunity to
express their wishes as to disclosure by means of a consent registry.
However, problems with the consent system arise when the birth
parents refuse to consent, or are unaware of the existence of the
registry. Two states have arrived at a more equitable system, which
provides that once the adoptee reaches adulthood, the state or the
birth parents bear the burden of showing why the records should not
be opened.
There remain in all states problems to be resolved in regard to
adoption records. States with rigid good cause systems should attempt
to better balance the wishes of the actual parties. Similarly, those
states that have made some strides should complete the work they
have begun and resolve the remaining problems. At the very least,
greater uniformity among the states is called for. An adoptee from
Kansas has unlimited access to his records, while an adoptee from
Louisiana must show compelling need. It is hoped that, as states continue to make changes in their adoption codes, these inequities will
disappear.
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